TEHRAN—Many policymakers in Washington seem to believe Iran has lacked clear leadership during the war. Leading the way has been U.S. President Donald Trump, who argues that there is no one in Iran for the United States to negotiate a peace deal with. After the attack that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he even suggested that he should help choose Iran’s next leader.

The suggestion from the U.S. government is that Iran is divided, unstable, and without direction. Recent events in Tehran tell a different story.

Iran’s political system has changed a lot during the war and the cease-fire that followed, but it’s indisputable that the system has held together. In fact, it has become more unified. This unity comes not just from force but also from rallying civilian support, even among those who do not fully support the government.

The differences between Ali Khamenei and his son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, show how things have changed. The elder Khamenei tried to keep balance among different groups and manage tensions inside the system and adopted a relatively restrained foreign policy that led some to accuse him of sacrificing Iran’s defense after the U.S. assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani in 2020.

The new supreme leader, on the other hand, is focusing on bringing networks together. He is using both religious and security institutions to create a model where various power centers actively work together, instead of just settling disputes between them. In the war, the younger Khamenei signaled a desire for confrontational wartime tactics, and others in the government, including the military, complied.

Their paths to leadership were also different: Ali Khamenei took over after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had died and the Iran-Iraq War ended, while Mojtaba Khamenei became leader during an active conflict and after his father was killed. As a result, today’s system values unity and quick action over internal debate.

The war did not create this system; it made it visible. For more than 20 years, the younger Khamenei carefully built networks of influence in politics, religion, and security. The first simulation of power was during Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency. At the time, many thought Raisi was meant to be the next supreme leader. The helicopter crash that took his life in May 2024 changed the course. Khamenei’s election as supreme leader in March was therefore a result of a long-planned transition toward the team now in charge.

Since becoming leader, Khamenei has stayed out of the public eye and mostly communicates in writing. Some people even doubted his survival, but two sources close to his team say he has mostly recovered from the injuries he got during the first attack on Iran’s leadership compound. He can move on his own now and has a visible scar on his face. There were at least two more failed assassination attempts during the conflict. For now, he keeps a low profile for security reasons. Still, he is active in politics, having met with President Masoud Pezeshkian at least once and responding to condolence messages personally, including one he sent to reformist leader Mohammad Khatami, showing he wants to build support across different political groups.

The way the system connects with the public has changed. In the past, state-organized demonstrations happened only on certain dates, such as the Islamic Revolution’s anniversary or Quds Day, and were mostly attended by older people. Now, Tehran’s streets are busy day and night with these demonstrations. Along with Basij militia members and Revolutionary Guards, many civilians, including many young people, are also present.

One big reason for this change is the rising influence of maddahan, religious performers who eulogize in public. In the last 20 years, their role has grown beyond just leading religious ceremonies. Now, they help shape stories, create emotional connections, and keep people engaged during crises, both in Iran and abroad.

Women are especially visible and active. When religious eulogist Mahdi Rasouli calls out, “You are Rostam,” referring to the Persian epic hero, women often lead the strong reply: “Strike, for you strike well.” These moments mix nationalism, wartime energy, and religious feeling, and they quietly challenge the idea that women are always pushed to the sidelines in Iran.

This sustained public presence, which has continued for nearly two months, is neither spontaneous nor simply coerced. It shows a coordinated system driven by overlapping networks. Clerical leaders, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and media actors operate through informal alliances developed over years. Although outward appearances suggest continuity, the basic mechanics of power have shifted. Authority now flows through these linked networks, allowing faster coordination and consensus. What previously functioned as a concealed layer of influence has been reorganized and activated.

Some people call this a “deep state,” but that label does not really fit. Instead of one hidden authority, there is a system made up of the IRGC, clerical groups, maddahan networks, media, and political figures. These parts depend on one another and work together as a visible, active network.

In this system, people such as parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf are becoming more important. Ghalibaf acts as a link between different groups and helps maintain stability during the transition, much as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani did in the 1980s. If he handles this period well, his influence will likely grow, especially as new political realities emerge, similar to the outcome of the previous change in leadership following Khomeini’s death.

The media landscape is changing, too. Networks that support the leadership are no longer just reacting; they now shape stories as events happen and adjust their messages for younger and international audiences. Good examples of that would be the viral Lego-style videos and the organized digital diplomacy campaign by Iran’s foreign ministry through embassies and consulates abroad. At the same time, a quieter but growing clerical network is gaining influence. Khamenei’s long connections in Qom’s seminaries are now more visible, both in the Assembly of Experts and among clerics in general.

Right now, power is shared between clerical leaders and the IRGC. This is not just a short-term deal or a strict hierarchy but a system where religious and revolutionary authority support each other. Important security leaders still have influence, but they now work more closely together and make decisions faster. Politics, security, and ideology are now tightly linked, which helps reduce internal conflict.

Nevertheless, this system is not without vulnerabilities. Problems could arise if clerical and security groups begin to disagree, especially as new people seek to gain power. The same close ties that make the system strong could also make it fragile if cracks appear. Making decisions faster might limit open debate, potentially building hidden tensions. Outside pressure, such as sanctions or increased international demands, could also erode unity within the country.

Although Trump announced last week an extension of the cease-fire to allow more time for negotiations, and initial contacts between U.S. and Iranian officials occurred in Pakistan, talks have failed to gain traction. The issue is no longer simply who represents Iran but whether there is any willingness to compromise on certain red lines. Tehran’s posture indicates not. Tehran has moved to restrict passage through the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington has escalated its response, effectively imposing a naval blockade and pledging to cut off Iran’s oil exports. The confrontation has shifted from diplomacy to pressure.

Given this, the main challenge for the Trump administration is not identifying who makes decisions in Tehran but dealing with a system that, even under pressure, is unwilling to give in. The same networks that kept things together during the war are now helping Iran to stick to a tough stance in negotiations, focusing on persistence instead of compromise.

This is where U.S. policymakers often misunderstand Iran. Saying the country has no leader says more about Washington’s wishful thinking than about what is really happening in Tehran. The real issue is realizing that Iran’s leadership now works in new and less obvious ways.

Iran still has leadership, but the way power is organized and used has changed. The system now works through networks and adapts as needed, relying on coordination instead of being out in the open. Any diplomats planning on negotiating with Iran should understand that its less divided and more responsive leadership makes it harder for outsiders to take advantage.

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